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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1995, Minnesota created a blended sentencing option for serious, 
violent juvenile offenders.  Under this new option, Extended Juvenile 
Jurisdiction (“EJJ”),1 the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the 
offender until age 21.2  In EJJ cases the court also imposes an adult 
sentence, which is stayed on the condition that the offender complies 
with the conditions of probation.3 
Since the passage of the EJJ statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
has issued a limited number of opinions reviewing EJJ cases.4  State v. 
B.Y.,5 issued April 24, 2003, involves an issue of first impression.  The 
B.Y. opinion addresses standards to be applied in EJJ probation 
revocation proceedings, holding that adult revocation standards apply to 
EJJ proceedings.6 
This case note provides a historical background of the EJJ statute7 
and probation revocation process8 in order to provide context for analysis 
of the B.Y. decision.  A brief description of the facts and the court’s 
analysis presents further background information for the court’s 
decision.9  The note goes on to discuss and explain the court’s decision 
in light of applicable statutes and case law.10 
This case note seeks to address the two central questions that arise 
from the B.Y. decision:  first, whether the application of adult revocation 
 
 1. Juveniles falling under EJJ are referred to as Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles. 
 2. MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.01, subd. 1. 
 3. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 4 (2002). 
 4. See In re Welfare of M.P.Y., 630 N.W.2d 411, 417-19 (Minn. 2001) (ruling that 
an EJJ criminal defendant cannot be precluded from testifying on his own behalf); In re 
Welfare of D.M.D., 607 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 2000) (confirming to the role of the 
public safety factors when the prosecution designates a juvenile EJJ); In re Welfare of 
G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690-96 (Minn. 1997) (addressing the validity of criminal 
procedure measures used in an EJJ case). 
 5. 659 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2003). 
 6. Id. at 768-69. 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part III.A-B. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
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standards to EJJ revocation proceedings is justified under the EJJ statute 
and other principles of law; and second, whether the Minnesota Supreme 
Court applied the analysis used in adult proceedings to the B.Y. case in a 
way that provides future guidance to lower courts. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Beginning of EJJ 
From 1992 to 1996, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia 
made substantive revisions to laws concerning juvenile crime.11  These 
revisions reflected a shift in the focus of juvenile courts from the 
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders to public safety and accountability.12  
This shift was, in part, due to an increase in serious, violent offenses 
committed by juveniles.13 
In Minnesota, the catalyst for change to the juvenile system came in 
1991 when juveniles represented 43% of the total number of arrests 
made for serious crimes.14  The 1992 Legislature addressed this problem 
by creating the Minnesota Task Force on the Juvenile Justice System 
(“Task Force”).15  The Task Force examined the process of transferring 
 
 11. See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES 
TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 59 (1996). 
 12. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile 
Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1071 (1995) (identifying trend toward public 
safety, punishment, and individual accountability within juvenile code legislative purpose 
clauses); see also Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 503, 523-24 (1984) (naming accountability and punishment as emerging 
purposes of juvenile justice statues and recognizing a heavier consideration of culpability 
and accountability in waiver and dispositional decisions); see also TORBET, supra note 
11, at 59 (providing a brief discussion of the changing purpose of the juvenile justice 
system); Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kari L. Lillesand, Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles in 
Minnesota: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1303, 1304 
(explaining that Minnesota’s juvenile statute reforms shifted the focus of the juvenile 
courts from rehabilitation to public safety). 
 13. See TORBET, supra note 11, at 59 (suggesting that changes made in juvenile 
justice systems came about as a legal response to juvenile crime). 
 14. See DANIEL STORKAMP, MINNESOTA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
CENTER, MINNESOTA PLANNING: OVERVIEW OF JUVENILE CRIME IN MINNESOTA 5 (Feb. 26, 
1993); Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 12, at 1305 (highlighting this statistic as one 
that caused the Legislature to act on juvenile matters). 
 15. See Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 7, § 13, 1992 Minn. Laws 1983, 2048.  
The Task Force was assigned to study the juvenile justice system and make 
recommendations regarding: 
(1) the juvenile certification process; 
(2) the retention of juvenile delinquency adjudication records and their use in 
3
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juveniles to adult court for prosecution and the disposition options 
available in juvenile court.16 In their report, the Task Force 
recommended to the Legislature significant revisions to the transfer 
process and the establishment of a juvenile blended-sentencing option, 
consisting of a juvenile court disposition and imposition of a stayed adult 
sentence.17  The Legislature adopted the Task Force’s recommendation, 
codified this blended sentencing option as “Extended Juvenile 
Jurisdiction,” and codified it at Minnesota Statutes section 260B.130.18  
The creation of EJJ gives juvenile courts the ability to impose upon a 
juvenile offender one or more juvenile dispositions and an adult criminal 
sentence, which is stayed on the condition that the juvenile does not 
violate the disposition order or commit a new offense.19 
In addition to creating the blended sentencing option of EJJ, this 
new legislation significantly altered the way in which juvenile cases 
could be transferred, or “certified,” to adult court.20  Before the Task 
Force recommendations were enacted in 1995, the transfer of juvenile 
cases to adult court was a possibility for any juvenile ages 14 to 17 who 
had committed any crime.21  Following the Task Force’s suggestions,22 
 
subsequent adult proceedings; 
(3) the feasibility of a system of statewide juvenile guidelines; 
(4) the effectiveness of various juvenile justice system approaches, including 
      behavior modification and treatment; and 
(5) the extension to juveniles of a nonwaivable right to counsel and a right to  
a jury trial. 
Id. at subd. 4(1)-(5). 
 16. See ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, MINNESOTA 
SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT 31-37 (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE, FINAL 
REPORT].  The Task Force’s recommendations contemplated the needs of the juvenile 
offender and the need to control the juvenile for the benefit of the juvenile and protection 
of society.  Id. at 3. 
 17. See id. (providing a thorough discussion of how these recommendations were 
reached). 
 18. See also Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 12, at 1306, 1306 n.21 (explaining 
blended sentencing as involving a juvenile and adult sentence); TORBET, supra note 11, at 
11-14 (providing a detailed explanation of the five models of blended sentencing that 
have emerged). 
19.    MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 4(a). 
 20. MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1992) (current version at § 260B.125 (2002)) 
(reflecting the certification process before the implementation of the EJJ designation). 
 21. MINN. STAT. § 260.125.  Before 1995, the transfer process, called “reference,” 
was not limited to the severity of the offense.  § 260.125.  The 1992 statute authorized the 
reference of a juvenile to adult court upon the finding of probable cause to believe the 
juvenile committed the offense and a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
child was not suitable for treatment in the juvenile system or that public safety was not 
served by retaining the case in juvenile court.  § 260.125, subd. 2(d)(1),(2).  The statute 
further included specifications for establishing a prima facie case for transferring to adult 
4
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the legislature revised the transfer statute by limiting certification to 
felony offenses and designating public safety as the primary concern.23  
A significant aspect of this revision was the creation of presumptive and 
non-presumptive certification processes.24  Under the statute, 
certification is presumed for juveniles ages 16 or 17 who commit a 
felony offense for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume a 
commitment to prison25 or that involve a firearm.26  In presumptive 
certification cases, the juvenile bears the burden of proving, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that retaining the proceedings in juvenile court as 
an EJJ case serves public safety.27 
Non-presumptive certification cases include all felonies committed 
by 14- and 15-year-olds, and offenses committed by 16- or 17-year-olds 
that do not call for a presumptive prison sentence under the Guidelines or 
do not involve the use of a firearm.28  In non-presumptive cases, the state 
bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
retaining the proceeding in juvenile court does not serve public safety.29 
While seeking to ensure a more consistent approach for certifying 
the most serious juvenile offenders to be prosecuted as adults,30 the Task 
Force also sought to give juveniles “one last chance at success in the 
 
court 16-year-olds and 17-year-olds who had committed serious offenses.  § 260.125, 
subd. 3.  Within the prima facie case, the burden of proof was on the prosecution.  See 
Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 12, at 1306.  Prior to 1994, the Juvenile Court Rules 
set forth eleven factors for courts to consider in making the transfer decision.  See MINN. 
R. JUV. P. 32.05, subd. 2 (repealed 1996); see also TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 16, at 22-23 (detailing the criteria for certification in 1983). 
 22. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 27. 
 23. See Act of May 5, 1994, ch. 576, § 13, 1994 Minn. Laws 934, 940-945 
(showing a record of the amendments made to MINN. STAT. § 260.125); Act of May 5, 
1994, ch. 576, § 68, 1994 Minn. Laws 934, 985 (referencing the effective date of ch. 576, 
§ 13, 1994 Minn. Laws 934, 940-945 as January 1, 1995). 
 24. See Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 12, at 1308 (explaining this distinction 
as a significant amendment to the transfer procedure). 
 25. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 3(2) (2002) (specifying that a presumptive 
commitment to prison can result from the sentencing guidelines or an applicable statute). 
 26. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 3 (articulating the criteria for the presumption of 
certification). 
 27. Id.  
 28. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 1 (allowing but not requiring certification of 
felony offenders older than 14); § 260B.125, subd. 3 (failing to include 16- and 17-year-
olds as requiring presumptive certification when their committed offense does not 
presume a prison sentence or involve the use of a firearm). 
 29. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 2(6)(ii). 
 30. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 27 (recommending 
implementation of a system that would make it easier to certify the most serious juvenile 
offenders). 
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juvenile system, with the threat of adult sanctions as an incentive not to 
reoffend.”31  The Task Force established this “one last chance” as EJJ, to 
give deserving juveniles an opportunity to change through treatment in 
the juvenile system32 while still providing public safety protections by 
imposing a stayed adult sentence.33  The legislature responded to the 
Task Force’s recommendations by statutorily creating EJJ.34 
EJJ designations are reserved for juvenile felony offenders ages 14 
to 17.35  There are three ways in which an offender may be designated an 
EJJ: automatic, presumptive, and designated.36  Automatic EJJ 
prosecution applies to juveniles 16 or older who commit a felony offense 
using a firearm or for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume a 
commitment to prison.37  In these cases, a prosecutor has the authority to 
designate the case as an EJJ prosecution.38  Presumptive EJJ designation 
occurs when, following a presumptive certification hearing, the trial 
court denies the prosecutor’s motion for certification.  In such cases, the 
trial court is required to designate the case as an EJJ prosecution.39  The 
final path to EJJ designation is through a successful motion to designate 
the case an EJJ prosecution.40  Prior to designating the proceedings as 
EJJ under either of the last two paths, the court must weigh six public 
safety factors.41  These six factors focus on the juvenile’s prior history, 
 
 31. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 33; see Santelmann & Lillesand, 
supra note 12, at 1309. 
 32. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 31 (providing the rationale for 
the creation of blended sentencing). 
 33. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 33. 
 34. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1994 and Supp. 1995) (current version at MINN. 
STAT. § 260B.130 (2002)) (codifying the EJJ designation as an option for juvenile 
offenders). 
 35. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 1 (listing the various routes for juvenile 
offenders to be designated as an EJJ). 
 36. See In re Welfare of D.M.D., Jr., 607 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Minn. 2000) (citing 
relevant statutory sections). 
 37. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 1(2). 
 38. Id.; MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.01, subd. 3(B). 
 39. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 8. 
 40. Id.; MINN. R. JUV. P. 18.06, subd. 1(B)(1). 
 41. MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.05.  The six factors determining if public safety would be 
served through an EJJ designation are: 
(A) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protection, 
including the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the use of a firearm, or the impact on the 
victim; 
(B) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense, including 
the level of the child’s participation in planning and carrying out the offense 
6
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current offense, and amenability to treatment in the juvenile system.42 
B.  Minnesota’s Approach to Revoking Probation 
An essential element to the EJJ designation is the imposition of a 
stayed adult prison sentence as a deterrent to reoffending.43  If a juvenile 
designated EJJ violates the conditions of his or her stayed sentence or 
commits a new offense, probation revocation proceedings may be 
commenced.44  The juvenile is entitled to notice and a hearing of any 
revocation proceeding.45  If, following the hearing, the court finds 
reasons exist to revoke the stay of execution of sentence, the court may 
then treat the juvenile offender as an adult and order any of the adult 
sanctions authorized.46  However, if the EJJ offender was convicted of an 
offense that presumed a commitment to prison or was convicted of any 
offense that involved a firearm, and if the court finds that reasons exist to 
revoke the stay, Minnesota’s statute provides that the court must execute 
the formerly imposed sentence unless the court also finds mitigating 
factors.47 
The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide further 
guidance in the process of EJJ revocation.48  These rules equip the court 
 
and the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines; 
(C) the child’s prior record of delinquency; 
(D) the child’s programming history, including the child’s past willingness to 
participate meaningfully in available programming; 
(E) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile 
justice system; 
(F) the dispositional options available for the child. 
MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.05. 
 42. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 31 (citing Charles E. 
Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
397, 417 (1991)). 
 43. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 33 (recognizing the Task 
Force’s intent to adopt the blended sentencing option as an incentive for the juvenile to 
be rehabilitated). 
 44. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5. 
 45. Id. (allowing the juvenile a chance to challenge the claimed violation(s)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  Without the presence of mitigating factors that could justify continuing the 
stay, the court has no discretion in implementing the stayed adult sentence when the 
offense presumed a commitment to prison or involved a firearm.  Id. 
 48. MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.09 (articulating the procedural rules for EJJ proceedings 
and prosecution). 
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with discretionary authority to execute the stayed sentence of an EJJ 
offender if the court finds upon clear and convincing evidence that the 
probationer violated any provision of the disposition order or if the 
probationer admitted to a violation of the disposition order.49  The 
discretionary authority of the court becomes compulsory when the court 
finds the probationer violated a provision of the disposition order or 
admitted to a violation of the disposition order when the initial EJJ 
conviction involved an offense holding a presumptive prison sentence or 
an offense involving a firearm.50  The only exception to this compulsory 
execution is if the court makes written findings noting the mitigating 
factors that validate continuing the stay.51  Both the EJJ statute and 
juvenile procedural rule governing EJJ are silent as to what constitutes 
“mitigating factors.” 
The United States Supreme Court established standards governing 
the process of revocation for parolees in Morrissey v. Brewer.52  The 
Supreme Court recognized that the effectiveness of parole stems from the 
court’s ability to return the parolee to prison for failing to adhere to the 
conditions of parole.53  A parole officer holds broad discretion in seeking 
to have parole revoked.54  One year later, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,55 the 
Supreme Court extended the Morrissey decision to apply equally to 
probationers.56  The Scarpelli Court reinforced the broad discretion of a 
probation officer in holding the authority to recommend or even declare 
revocation of probation.57 
State v. Austin established the criteria that Minnesota trial courts 
must use in adult probation violation proceedings.58  In determining 
 
 49. Id. at subd. 3(C)(1). 
 50. Id. at subd. 3(C)(2). 
 51. Id. 
 52. 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (holding that parolees are entitled to due process 
when facing revocation of their parole and a return to prison).  Parole is supervision that 
follows an offender’s release from prison.  See id. at 474-75. 
 53. See id. at 478-79. 
 54. See id. at 479 (noting that broad discretion is also inherent in the role of a parole 
officer simply by the vague conditions of parole).  “[A] parole officer ordinarily does not 
take steps to have parole revoked unless he thinks that the violations are serious and 
continuing so as to indicate that the parolee is not adjusting properly and cannot be 
counted on to avoid antisocial activity.”  Id. 
 55. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (affirming Morrissey in allowing due process for 
probationers). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 784 (citing the responsibility to supervise the probationer’s progress in 
rehabilitation as the reason for a parole officer’s broad discretion). 
 58. 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980) (establishing these criteria for the further 
8
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whether an adult probationer’s previously stayed sentence should be 
executed, Austin requires the court to: 
(1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were 
violated; 
(2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 
(3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies 
favoring probation.59 
Since the court’s decision in Austin in 1980, the three factors articulated 
in the decision have become the cornerstone of any trial court’s decision 
to revoke adult probation.60  However, until B.Y. the Austin factors had 
not been applied to EJJ probation revocation proceedings. 
With the creation of EJJ in 1995, Minnesota appellate courts 
developed the standard to be used in EJJ probation revocation 
proceedings.61  Distinguishing EJJ from adult probation violation 
proceedings, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held in State v. Bradley 
that only the first two Austin factors applied to EJJ revocation 
proceedings; the Bradley court noted that the third factor, weighing the 
need for confinement against policies favoring probation, is not 
consistent with the EJJ statute.62  The J.K. court followed precedent and 
evaluated EJJ revocation based upon only the first two Austin factors.63  
In addition to these two key appellate decisions, a number of unpublished 
appellate decisions have reviewed lower-court decisions revoking EJJ 
status.64  A number of these unpublished decisions follow the standard 
 
guidance of lower courts in determining probation revocation). 
 59. Id. (listing these factors as a mandatory evaluation by the court before adult 
probation may be revoked). 
 60. See State v. Hamilton, 646 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (applying 
the Austin factors in revoking adult probation); State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265, 267 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing the requirement of a court to engage in the Austin 
analysis while considering the revocation of adult probation). 
 61. See In re J.K., 641 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Bradley, 592 
N.W.2d 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 62. See Bradley, 592 N.W.2d at 887 (declining to evaluate the facts in light of the 
third Austin factor and recognizing more discretion in revoking EJJ probation relative to 
revoking adult probation). 
 63. See In re J.K., 641 N.W.2d at 621 (citing Bradley as authority in applying two 
of the three Austin factors). 
 64. See State v. Henson, No. C2-02-297, 2002 WL 1424430 at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 
July 2, 2002) (holding that probationer gave up his “one last chance” to be successful in 
the juvenile system by failing to obey his probation officer); State v. Washington, No. 
C0-02-914, 2002 WL 31553980 at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002) (revoking EJJ 
probation for probationer’s failure to maintain contact with his probation officer over a 
four-month period of time); State v. Yang, C9-02-605, 2002 WL 1614065 at *2 (Minn. 
9
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developed in Bradley and J.K.65 
III. STATE V. B.Y. 
A.  The Facts 
On February 9, 1998, B.Y., based upon a plea agreement, pled 
guilty to kidnapping and committing a crime for the benefit of a gang.66  
B.Y.’s plea resulted from his participation in the kidnapping and gang 
rape of a 12 year-old girl.67  At the time of the offense, B.Y. was 15 
years old and the prosecution had moved to certify him to stand trial as 
an adult.68  Because of B.Y.’s age at the time of the offense, certification 
to adult court was not presumptive.69 
In addition to his guilty plea to charges of kidnapping and 
committing a crime for the benefit of a gang, B.Y. agreed to designation 
 
Ct. App. July 23, 2002) (listing numerous probation violations as reason to revoke EJJ 
probation); In re Welfare of J.C.B., No. C2-00-649, 2000 WL 1778910 at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Nov. 21, 2000) (finding EJJ revocation proper under the EJJ statute and the 
applicable Rule of Juvenile Procedure for a “technical” probation violation); State v. 
McArthur, No. C4-99-502, 1999 WL 759985 at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1999) 
(executing a stayed sentence because probationer possessed a firearm in violation of his 
terms of probation); Welfare of C.A.S., No. C8-98-217, 1998 WL 345514 at *1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. June 30, 1998) (upholding probationer’s EJJ status due to probationer’s decision 
to reoffend). 
 65. See Henson, 2002 WL 1424430 at *3 (citing Austin as authority to revoke 
probation if a probation officer’s instructions are disobeyed); Yang, 2002 WL 1614065 at 
*1 (upholding the application of the first two Austin factors in revoking probation under 
the EJJ statute); In re Welfare of J.C.B., 2000 WL 1778910 at *2 (stating that the text of 
the EJJ statute does not require the district court to consider the third Austin factor); 
Welfare of C.A.S., 1998 WL 345514 at *2 (defining Austin as applying solely to adults 
violating probation).  But see Washington, 2002 WL 31553980 at *1 (failing to discuss 
Austin in its brief opinion); McArthur, 1999 WL 759985 at *1 (mentioning Austin only to 
provide the applicable standard of review). 
 66. State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2003) (explaining that B.Y.’s 
agreement to plead guilty to kidnapping and committing a crime to benefit a criminal 
gang was only one of the conditions of the plea bargain).  B.Y. was initially charged with 
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, conspiracy to commit criminal sexual conduct, 
kidnapping, and crime committed for the benefit of a gang.  Appellant’s Brief and App. at 
5, B.Y. (No. C7-01-897); Respondent’s Brief at 2, B.Y. (No. C7-01-897) (citing Plea Tr., 
Feb. 9, 1998, page 3).  The original Plea Transcript from February 9, 1998 is not 
accessible to the public because of B.Y.’s juvenile status at the time of the offense. 
 67. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765 (identifying the offense of the crime for the benefit of a 
criminal gang as gang rape). 
 68. Id.; see also Respondent’s Brief, supra note 66, at 2 (citing Plea Tr., Feb. 9, 
1998, p. 3). 
 69. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 3 (2002). 
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as an EJJ until the age of 21,70 and imposition of a 108-month adult 
prison sentence.71  Based on the EJJ designation, the adult sentence was 
stayed.  Further terms of B.Y.’s plea included his agreement to testify 
truthfully at the trials of other individuals involved in the offense, 
completion of a juvenile rehabilitation program, discontinued association 
with known gang members, and no contact with the victim.72 
The district court informed B.Y. at the sentencing hearing on 
February 9, 1998 that violations of the terms and conditions of probation 
would trigger the execution of the 108-month prison sentence.73  More 
than a year later, the court allowed B.Y. to return home after successfully 
completing the juvenile rehabilitation program at Woodland Hills.74  At a 
hearing in June of 1999, the court again reminded B.Y. that a probation 
violation before he turned 21 would result in the execution of the 108-
month prison sentence.75 
On February 9, 2001, B.Y. appeared before a juvenile court judge 
on allegations that he had violated the terms of his EJJ probation by 
failing to abide by the curfew set by his probation officer.76  The 
probable cause statement, attached to the probation violation warrant, 
also set forth other alleged violations of probation.77  At that hearing, 
 
 70. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765.  The court has authority over an EJJ who enters a 
guilty plea to impose one or more juvenile dispositions and an adult criminal sentence 
stayed upon the proposition that the juvenile does not violate the provisions in the 
disposition order or commit a new offense.  MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 4(a) (2002). 
 71. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765.  This sentence was set forth in the plea agreement.  Id.  
The agreement calculated the applicable sentences for kidnapping and crime for the 
benefit of a criminal gang.  Id.  The kidnapping charge held a presumptive prison 
sentence of forty-eight months.  Id.  This sentence was determined by assigning the 
severity level of 7 to the offense of Kidnapping-Victim Under 16 and examining the 
severity level under the Sentencing Guidelines Grid.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL, NUMERICAL REFERENCE OF FELONY STATUTES, SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 
IV (1997).  The plea included a double durational departure from the sentencing 
guidelines recommendation for kidnapping, equaling a ninety-six-month prison term.  
B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765.  The crime for the benefit of a criminal gang charge added a 
presumptive sentence of twelve months consecutive to the ninety-six months already 
determined by the kidnapping offense, resulting in a total stayed sentence of 108 months.  
Id. 
 72. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765. 
 73. Id.  Aside from the plea agreement, no additional conditions were discussed at 
the hearing or placed in the disposition order.  Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (quoting the court as saying “don’t commit any new crimes and keep in 
touch”). 
 76. Id. at 766. 
 77. Appellant’s Brief and App., supra note 67, Motion for Rehearing and Motion to 
Reconsider, at Appellant’s App. 1-1.  The “Probable Cause Statement attached to the 
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B.Y. admitted he violated his 9:00 p.m. curfew.78  The district court 
judge and court of appeals determined this admission constituted a 
probation violation.79  The trial court ordered a study to determine 
whether B.Y.’s EJJ designation should be revoked and the stayed adult 
sentence executed.80  At a subsequent disposition hearing, the state 
presented evidence of other violations.81  A probation officer testified 
that B.Y. had previously been placed on “enhanced probation” with a 
stricter level of supervision because of B.Y.’s inability to check in 
weekly with his probation officer.82  The State contended that B.Y. 
previously was placed at the Juvenile Detention Center for a curfew 
violation,83 failed to show up for eight hours of work crew for a separate 
curfew violation, refused to make up for the eight hours of missed work 
crew,84 and was placed at the Adult Detention Center for curfew and 
school attendance violations.85 
Following the report of the probation officer, and arguments of 
counsel, the court revoked B.Y.’s EJJ status and executed his 108-month 
sentence.86  The district court found that there were no mitigating factors 
to justify continuing the stay of execution of the adult sentence.87  Based 
 
[Probation Violation Warrant] listed numerous curfew violations from 11-30-00 to 2-6-
01.”  Id.  The original Probable Cause Statement and Probation Violation Warrant are not 
accessible to the public due to B.Y.’s juvenile status at the time of the offense. 
 78. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 766. 
 79. Id.; see also State v. Yang, No. C7-01-897, 2002 WL 523433 at *3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 9, 2002) (concluding that even a “technical” violation is still a violation).  The 
court of appeals opinion also discusses the district court’s findings of B.Y.’s probationary 
history as involving repeated failures to comply with conditions laid out by his probation 
officer and numerous warnings that violating these conditions would result in probation 
revocation.  Id. 
 80. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 66, at 4 (citing Tr. of Hearing Feb. 9, 2001, 
p. 6).  The original Transcript of Hearing from February 9, 2001 is not accessible to the 
public because of B.Y.’s juvenile status at the time of the offense. 
 81. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 766.  The State argued that it would not seek revocation of 
probation “for a mere curfew violation had there not been multiple violations and had 
[B.Y.] not shown that he was unamenable to supervision.”  Id. 
 82. Id.  The transfer to “enhanced probation” resulted from a one- to two-month 
period where B.Y. did not properly report to his probation officer and concerns were 
raised that B.Y. was not attending school or residing at his parents’ house full time.  Id. 
 83. Id. (asserting that B.Y. was placed on twenty-four-hour hold at the Juvenile 
Detention Center). 
 84. Id.  B.Y. was given two eight-hour days on a work crew for a violation; B.Y. 
failed to show up on the second day. 
 85. Id. (asserting that B.Y. was placed on forty-eight-hour hold at the Adult 
Detention Center). 
 86. Id. 
 87. State v. Yang, No. C7-01-897, 2002 WL 523433 at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 
2002) (referencing the district court’s failure to find any mitigating factors). 
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upon this finding, the court was compelled to execute B.Y.’s stayed 
sentence.88  After hearing B.Y.’s appeal, the court of appeals affirmed 
the district court’s decision.89 
B.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Analysis 
In reviewing the district court and court of appeals opinions, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court examined the provisions of the EJJ statute 
governing probation violations.  The court concluded that the statutory 
provision requiring execution of the stayed adult sentence when the 
original offense assumes a presumptive prison sentence applies to all EJJ 
offenders, regardless of age.90  This portion of the opinion holds that 
presumptive execution of an adult sentence is not limited to 16- and 17-
year-olds.91  In so holding, the court found that the Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure and the statute do not conflict as they relate to the standards 
for execution of an adult sentence.92 
Next, the court examined whether the Austin factors are applicable 
to EJJ probation revocation proceedings.93  The court concluded that all 
three of the Austin factors must be considered to determine if “reasons 
exist to revoke the stayed sentence.”94  The court reasoned that the need 
to balance a probationer’s interest in freedom with the State’s interest in 
ensuring rehabilitation and public safety, as required under Austin, is also 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (concluding that execution of B.Y.’s stayed sentence is required under 
MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 absent any mitigating factors).  The court of appeals 
noted that B.Y’s probation history included repeated failures to abide by conditions of his 
probation and repeated warnings by the court and probation officer that violations would 
trigger revocation of his probation.  Id. at *3. 
 90. See B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768 (determining this to be true once the violation has 
been established); MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (differentiating between the 
circumstances when adult sentences shall or must be executed). 
 91. See B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768 (agreeing with the prosecution that B.Y.’s age at 
the time of the offense was not a factor in the revocation proceedings). 
 92. See id. (identifying the consistency between the statute and rule to recognize the 
offense rather than age as the key factor in determining the mandatory or discretionary 
execution of adult sentence).  Compare MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (recognizing 
the EJJ conviction due to an offense with a presumptive prison sentence as a crucial 
component in the court’s requirement to order execution of an adult sentence) with MINN. 
R. JUV. P. 19.09, subd. 3(C)(2) (failing to address age while stating requirements for the 
court to order execution of an adult sentence). 
 93. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768 (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not yet 
addressed Austin in light of EJJ probation revocation). 
 94. Id. (distinguishing this requirement as an addition to the requirement that the 
EJJ conviction be based upon an offense that presumed a prison sentence or involved a 
firearm). 
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present in EJJ revocation proceedings because “revocation of EJJ 
probation may result in the execution of an adult sentence.”95  The court 
went on to note that Rule 19.09, subdivision 3(C)(2) of the Minnesota 
Rules of Juvenile Procedure contains neither the statute’s “reasons to 
reduce the stay” language, nor the Austin analysis.96  Based upon these 
deficits, the court directed the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on 
the Rules of Juvenile Procedure to review Rule 19.09, subdivision 3(C) 
for appropriate amendments incorporating the Austin factors.97 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE B.Y. DECISION 
Since the passage of Minnesota’s EJJ statute, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has issued a limited number of opinions addressing 
substantive issues related to EJJ.98  Prior to B.Y., none of these decisions 
had addressed the issue of revocation of EJJ status.  In B.Y., the court 
addressed revocation for the first time and held that the standards of 
probation revocation established in Austin apply to EJJ revocation 
proceedings.99  As discussed above, in so holding, the court overruled the 
court of appeals decisions in J.K. and Bradley.100 
Prior to B.Y., an EJJ offender was in a unique category—neither 
juvenile nor adult offender but a blend of both.  Previously, the adult 
standards for probation revocation were not applied based upon a literal 
reading of the governing statutory provisions.101  B.Y. has changed this.  
Now, in terms of probation violation proceedings, the analysis used in 
 
 95. Id. at 769. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 769 n.3. 
 98. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.M.D., Jr., 607 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 2000) (holding 
that nonoffense related evidence of a juvenile’s dangerousness is not a requirement for 
the prosecution to designate a juvenile offender as an EJJ under the public safety 
requirements).  The Minnesota Supreme Court has issued other decisions addressing EJJ 
procedural concerns.  See supra note 4. 
 99. See B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768-69 (stating that all three Austin factors must be met 
to revoke probation). 
 100. Id.; see also In re Welfare of J.K., 641 N.W.2d 617, 621 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(recognizing that the EJJ text does not require consideration of the third Austin factor); 
State v. Bradley, 592 N.W.2d 886, 887-88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that the 
third Austin factor is not easily reconciled with the EJJ statute). 
 101. The Bradley court held that the third Austin factor, weighing confinement 
against probation policy, conflicted with the EJJ statute requirement of revoking 
probation for a violation absent any mitigating factors.  592 N.W.2d at 887.  The J.K. 
court reinforced Bradley’s holding that it is not necessary under the EJJ statute to 
consider the third Austin factor.  641 N.W.2d at 621. 
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adult cases must be applied to EJJ offenders.102 
A.  The Age of the Offender in EJJ Probation Violation Proceedings 
The first issue addressed by the B.Y. court clarified the distinction 
between violations of probation that require the trial court to execute the 
stayed adult sentence and those that do not.103  The provision governing 
probation violation proceedings, section 260B.130, subdivision 5 of the 
Minnesota Statutes, provides in pertinent part that: 
If the offender was convicted of an offense described in 
subdivision 1, clause (2), and the court finds that reasons exist 
to revoke the stay, the court must order execution of the 
previously imposed sentence unless the court makes written 
findings regarding the mitigating factors that justify continuing 
the stay.104 
Subdivision 1, clause (2) of the same statute describes both the offender 
and the offense for which EJJ designation is mandatory upon designation 
by the prosecutor.105  This provision  applies to any 16- or 17-year-old 
offender alleged to have committed a felony if the offense is one for 
which the Sentencing Guidelines and applicable statutes presume a 
commitment to prison or in which the offender allegedly used a 
firearm.106 
The sole issue raised by the appellant involved the application of the 
language of section 260B.130, subdivision 5, to offenders younger than 
16.107  The appellant argued that, because the language of subdivision 1, 
clause (2) refers to both the age of the offender and the offense, the 
language of subdivision 5, requiring the execution of the adult sentence 
absent mitigating circumstances, does not apply to any EJJ offender 
younger than 16 at the time of the offense.108  Appellant further argued 
that, based upon this interpretation, subdivision 3(C)(2) of Minnesota 
Rule of Juvenile Procedure 19.09 is inconsistent with the statute.109 
 
 102. By ruling that the third Austin factor applies to EJJ revocation proceedings, B.Y. 
changed the standards for EJJ probation violators to equal the standards of adult 
probation violators.  See B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768. 
 103. See id. at 767. 
 104. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (2002). 
 105. Id. at subd. 1(2) (2002). 
 106. Id. 
 107. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 767. 
 108. See id. 
 109. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 767.  The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure do not 
refer to an offender’s age, only the offense, when articulating under what circumstances a 
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The State argued that the appellant’s position required an implied 
amendment to the revocation statute, changing the pertinent language of 
section 260B.130, subdivision 5 from “if the offender was convicted of 
an offense described in subdivision 1, clause (2)” to “if the offender was 
designated EJJ pursuant to subdivision 1, clause (2).”110 
The court summarily rejected the appellant’s argument.111  In a 
well-reasoned analysis, the court interpreted the statute according to its 
plain meaning.112  The court noted that subdivision 5 of section 
260B.130 refers to “an offense described in subdivision 1, clause (2)” 
and does not “mention the age of the offender.”113  Based upon this plain 
language, the court held that subdivision 5, section 260B.130 “is 
properly read to require the execution of the adult sentence, absent 
written mitigating factors, regardless of the age of the defendant at the 
time of the original offense.”114  Thus, the court reasonably concluded 
that the statute and rule do not conflict.  The court’s reasoning is also 
consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines, which do not distinguish 
between a presumptive stay or executed sentence based upon the age of 
the offender.115 
B.  Application of Austin to EJJ Probation Revocation Proceedings 
The central issue addressed by the court in B.Y. was not one 
specifically raised by the appellant.116  After clarifying that the age of the 
offender is immaterial to the revocation decision, the court went on to 
discuss the application of Austin to EJJ probation violation 
proceedings.117  It is this application of the Austin analysis to EJJ 
proceedings that is the focus of this case note. 
As set forth above, Austin established a three-step analysis for 
courts to use in determining whether reasons exist to revoke an adult 
 
trial court is required to order execution of the adult sentence.  MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.09, 
subd. 3(C)(2). 
 110. Respondent’s Brief and App., supra note 66, at 30. 
 111. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 767-68. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 768. 
 115. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 49 (2003) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES].  The 
two determinative factors in the Sentencing Guidelines Grid are the severity of the 
offense committed and the offender’s criminal history score.  Id. 
 116. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768. 
 117. See id. at 768-69. 
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offender’s probation.118  In B.Y., the court held that all three of the Austin 
factors apply to EJJ probation revocation proceedings.119  This decision 
raises two fundamental concerns.  The first concern is whether applying 
the three Austin factors to EJJ revocation proceedings is consistent with 
the EJJ statute and other principles of law.120  The second concern is 
whether the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the Austin factors in a 
manner that lower courts can understand and implement.121 
C.  Application of the Austin Analysis to EJJ Probation Revocation 
Proceedings 
A fundamental difficulty in understanding the B.Y. decision can be 
traced to the governing statute’s failure to distinguish between the two 
decisions a trial court must make in EJJ revocation proceedings.122  In 
EJJ probation violation proceedings, unlike adult violation proceedings, 
the trial court must first decide whether to revoke an offender’s EJJ 
designation.123  If the trial court determines revocation of the EJJ 
designation is warranted, then the trial court must decide whether 
grounds exist to execute the stayed adult sentence.124  Thus, the decision 
to revoke EJJ designation is a decision to transfer the case to adult court 
and nothing more. 
It is unclear from the holding in B.Y. whether the court intended the 
Austin analysis to apply to the decision to revoke EJJ designation, or 
simply to the decision to execute the adult sentence once EJJ status has 
been revoked.  If the decision is read to require the Austin analysis 
applies to the decision to revoke an offender’s EJJ designation, then 
application of the third Austin factor does not seem to fit within the 
analytical structure of the statute. 
 
 118. See supra Part II.B. 
 119. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769. 
 120. See infra Part IV.C. 
 121. See infra Part IV.D. 
 122. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (2002).  The imprecise language of MINN. 
STAT. § 260B.130, subdivision 5 simply requires the trial court to determine whether 
“reasons exist to revoke the stay of execution of sentence . . . .”  Id.  However, execution 
of the stayed adult sentence does not automatically flow from the decision to revoke the 
EJJ designation.  Under the statute, the trial court’s decision to execute the adult sentence 
does not arise unless the court first finds that the offender has violated his or her EJJ 
probation.  See id.  The court must then determine, based on whether the Sentencing 
Guidelines provide for a presumptive or non-presumptive prison sentence, whether 
execution of the stayed sentence is warranted.  Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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It appears that by the terms of the statute, the juvenile court judge 
must find an intentional or inexcusable violation of a term of probation 
before transfer of the case to adult court.125  Due process requires such 
proof.126  Thus, application of the first two Austin factors to the decision 
to revoke an offender’s EJJ designation is justified under both the statute 
and governing principles of law.  However, application of the third 
Austin factor to the decision to revoke an offender’s EJJ designation is 
premature. 
Revocation of an offender’s EJJ designation does not automatically 
result in execution of a prison sentence in either presumptive or non-
presumptive cases.127  In non-presumptive cases, once the trial court has 
ordered revocation of the offender’s EJJ status and transferred the case to 
adult court, the court can then order any of the sanctions available to an 
adult sentencing court.128  It is unnecessary to determine that the “need 
for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation,” the third 
factor under Austin, if the trial court can simply continue the offender on 
adult probation.  In presumptive cases, the statute requires the court to 
execute the stayed adult sentence unless it finds mitigating factors to 
justify continuing the stay.129  Thus, in both non-presumptive and 
presumptive cases, application of the third Austin factor is unnecessary to 
the decision to transfer the case to adult court through revocation of the 
EJJ designation. 
The practical result is that the third Austin factor must be modified 
slightly in order to logically apply it to the decision to revoke an EJJ 
 
 125. Id.  The statute requires a finding that the offender violated a condition of the 
stayed sentence and that reasons exist to revoke the stay of execution of sentence.  Id. 
 126. The United States Supreme Court established the principle that parolees are 
entitled to due process when facing revocation of their parole and a return to prison.  See 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 499-500 (1972).  One year later, this principle was 
extended to probationers facing revocation.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-
82 (1973).  The minimum due process to which offenders are entitled includes: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the 
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to 
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds 
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” 
hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not 
be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders 
[sic] as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. 
 127. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (2002). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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designation.  At the stage where a court considers revoking an offender’s 
EJJ status, the issue is whether the need to transfer the case to adult court 
outweighs the desire to retain the offender in the juvenile system.  With 
this caveat, application of the Austin analysis can be made to fit the 
decision to revoke EJJ designation. 
The holding in B.Y. can also be read as applicable only to the 
decision to revoke the stay of execution of sentence following revocation 
of EJJ designation.  This interpretation is reasonable because the court 
refers to the decision to revoke the stay of execution of sentence when 
applying the Austin analysis.  If the opinion is interpreted in this way, the 
decision is consistent with the philosophy adopted by the court in Austin 
and its progeny.  However, it raises serious questions about whether the 
intent of the statute can be enforced.  The Bradley court articulated the 
intent of the statute.130 
In Bradley, the court of appeals noted that the balance between the 
need for confinement and the policies favoring probation is difficult to 
reconcile with the policies articulated in the EJJ statute.131  The Bradley 
court held that, in light of the “one last chance” nature of EJJ 
proceedings, the trial court was not required to consider whether the need 
for confinement outweighed the policy in favor of probation.132  
However, the Task Force report did not characterize EJJ as the one last 
chance to avoid adult prison.  The “one last chance” contemplated by the 
Task Force was “success in the juvenile system, with the threat of adult 
sanctions as an incentive not to reoffend.”133 
Furthermore, the statute gives trial courts the option, upon 
revocation of the EJJ designation, to continue or execute the stayed adult 
sentence.134  Based upon both the Task Force report and the provisions 
of the statute, it is perhaps more accurate to characterize EJJ as the “one 
last chance at juvenile programming.”  Thus, application of the Austin 
analysis may not be as inconsistent with the intent of the statute as it first 
appears.  Yet, it can also be argued that to require the trial court to 
consider whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies 
favoring probation when deciding whether to revoke the stay of 
execution of sentence ignores the second stated intent of the EJJ statute: 
certainty of punishment. 
 
 130. State v. Bradley, 592 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 131. Id. at 887. 
 132. Id. at 888. 
 133. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 33. 
 134. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5. 
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Certainty of punishment upon violation of EJJ probation was a 
critical component of the statute when drafted and passed.135  This is 
particularly clear in cases where the Sentencing Guidelines presume a 
commitment to prison.  In these cases, the trial court must execute the 
stayed adult sentence unless it finds mitigating factors.136  Application of 
the third Austin factor diminishes this certainty of punishment.  
Moreover, its  application to an EJJ case where the statute presumes 
certification to adult court appears to discount the opportunity the 
offender was given to prove that the policies favoring probation 
outweigh the need for confinement. 
In its application of the third Austin factor, the B.Y. court does not 
address the opportunity the offender has already been given to avoid 
adult prison.  A trial court, when it honors a plea agreement or makes an 
independent determination to designate an offender as EJJ, has already 
considered the question of whether the policies favoring probation 
outweigh the need for confinement in an adult institution.  When the 
court designates the offender EJJ, it has already found that the offender 
should be given the opportunity to avoid adult prison through 
programming in the juvenile system.  The B.Y. court does not explain 
why the trial court should again be required to examine whether the need 
for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation at the time of 
revocation of EJJ designation.  Furthermore, requiring the court to 
conduct this examination when addressing the second decision, whether 
to execute the adult sentence, is consistent with the terms of the statute, 
but only in non-presumptive cases.  Once the decision has been made to 
revoke an offender’s EJJ designation, in non-presumptive cases, the 
statute gives the court all the sentencing options available in adult 
proceedings.  To apply the third Austin factor in non-presumptive cases 
to the decision to execute the stayed sentence gives the EJJ offender the 
same protections adults enjoy.  This result seems fair and just.  However, 
in presumptive cases, the equities are not as clear. 
In presumptive prison cases, unless the probation-versus-
confinement analysis is interpreted to be the examination of mitigating 
factors required by the EJJ statute, application of the third Austin factor 
 
 135. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 34.  Furthermore, upon 
designation of EJJ, the trial court must impose a stayed adult sentence.  The statute does 
not allow for a stay of imposition of sentence.  Thus, the adult sentence that the offender 
may face upon revocation of the designation is established with certainty at the time of 
EJJ designation. 
 136. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5. 
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provides the EJJ offender more protections than afforded an adult 
offender.  Furthermore, unless the statute’s reference to mitigating 
factors requires an analysis consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines, 
EJJ offenders who commit an offense for which the Guidelines presume 
a commitment to prison will be treated differently than adults who 
commit the same type of offense.  Because the B.Y. court did not address 
application of the sentencing guidelines to EJJ revocation proceedings, 
these issues remain unresolved. 
D.  Application of the Austin Analysis 
Perhaps the most helpful aspect of the B.Y. decision for practitioners 
is its articulation of the mitigating factors that justify continuing the stay 
of execution of sentence.137  However, the difficulties with the decision 
include an unclear standard of review, an unclear amount of authority 
probation officers should be given to monitor EJJ offenders, and an 
unclear role of the reviewing court. 
Minnesota has historically afforded the trial court broad discretion 
to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to revoke probation.138  
Furthermore, as articulated in Austin and its progeny, a trial court’s 
decision is to be reversed only when the reviewing court finds a clear 
abuse of this discretion.139  The Minnesota Court of Appeals used this 
standard of review as it reviewed the trial court’s decision to revoke 
 
 137. State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763, 770-72 (Minn. 2003) (providing discussion as to 
the mitigating factors in B.Y.’s situation). 
 138. Minnesota appellate courts have long recognized the broad discretion of a trial 
court in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation, reversing 
only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion.  See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 646 
N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Schwartz, 615 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2000); State v. Balma, 549 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. 
Hlavac, 540 N.W.2d 551, 552 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265, 
266-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992); State v. Wittenberg, 441 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Fritsche, 402 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Moot, 398 N.W.2d 21, 23 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Scholberg, 393 N.W.2d 247, 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 139. See State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980) (determining the 
standard of review for reviewing adult probation revocation); see, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 
646 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Schwartz, 615 N.W.2d 85, 90 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Balma, 549 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); 
State v. Hlavac, 540 N.W.2d 551, 552 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 
265, 266-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. Wittenberg, 441 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting 
State v. Ehmke, 400 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)); State v. Fritsche, 402 
N.W.2d 197, 201 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Moot, 398 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1987); State v. Scholberg, 393 N.W.2d 247, 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
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B.Y.’s probation.140  However, this was not the standard of review used 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
The opinion states that the applicability of the Austin factors directly 
related to the interpretation of the EJJ statute, implying a de novo 
standard of review.  The de novo standard is traditionally used when 
reviewing statutory interpretations.141  Thus, it is the appropriate 
standard of review for the court to use when interpreting the revocation 
provisions of the EJJ statute to include the Austin analysis.  However, the 
court did not then examine the trial court’s decision to revoke B.Y.’s EJJ 
status and execute the adult sentence using an abuse of discretion 
standard of review.  Rather, the court found that the trial court “erred” in 
revoking B.Y.’s EJJ probation.142 
The B.Y. opinion makes no mention of the broad discretion to be 
afforded the trial court.  Nor does it state that reversal can only be based 
upon a finding that the trial court clearly abused this discretion.  Thus, 
while applying the same analysis used in adult revocation proceedings to 
EJJ revocation proceedings, the court does not apply the same standard 
of review.  Consequently, the opinion calls into question the previously 
well-established standard of review to be used in probation violation 
proceedings. 
The B.Y. decision also calls into question the authority of a 
probation officer to set conditions of probation.  The decision appears to 
hold that the court may not find a violation of probation if the specific 
condition violated has not been established by the court either in the 
disposition order or by announcing it from the bench.143 
Citing to Rule 19.09, subdivision 3(C)(2) of the Minnesota Rules of 
Juvenile Procedure, the court found that B.Y.’s admitted violation of 
curfew could not be the basis for executing his sentence because the 
curfew condition was not part of the disposition order.144  This finding 
disregards the general term of probation set by the trial court to abide by 
the terms of probation.145  The finding is also inconsistent with the long-
 
 140. See State v. Yang, No. C7-01-897, 2002 WL 523433, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 9, 2002). 
 141. See, e.g., State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003); Jorgensen v. 
Knutson, 662 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. 2003); BCBSM, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 663 
N.W.2d 531, 532 (Minn. 2003); State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 914 (Minn. 1996). 
 142. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769. 
 143. Using the language of Rule 19 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 
the B.Y. court requires the conditions of probation to be in the disposition order.  Id. 
 144. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769. 
 145. See State v. Bee Yang, No. C7-01-897, 2002 WL 523433 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 
9, 2002) (recognizing that the district court stayed B.Y.’s sentence “on the condition that 
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established authority given to probation officers to set some terms of 
probation. 
Courts have long recognized that an order to abide by the conditions 
of probation conveys to the probation officer significant discretion.146  
Ironically, the Austin decision upon which the court bases its ruling in 
B.Y. involved the violation of a condition set by the probation officer.  
The Austin court, in affirming the trial court’s revocation of probation, 
held that there was “sufficient evidence to warrant finding that the 
appellant intentionally disobeyed his probation officer’s instructions.”147  
Therefore, they found “no abuse of discretion in the decision to revoke 
probation.”148 
In B.Y., the court does not appear to recognize the authority of a 
probation officer to set conditions for a probationer and have those 
conditions enforced by the court through violation proceedings.  This 
lack of recognition was apparent in the court’s refusal to consider the 
curfew violation because it was not part of the disposition order, and its 
discussion of mitigating factors. 
Determination of mitigating factors under the EJJ probation 
violation statute is an issue of first impression.149  Therefore, the court’s 
articulation of the mitigating factors presented in B.Y. is helpful.  
 
he not violate the terms of his probation”).  The court also finds that B.Y.’s admission to 
the curfew violation was not an admission to the probation violation.  All parties 
understood that B.Y. admitted that, by violating curfew, he violated his EJJ probation. 
See id. at *1; Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 66, at 6; Respondent’s Brief, 
supra note 66, at 9.  Thus, the Supreme Court created a factual distinction that is not 
supported by the record. 
 146. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478-79 (1972).  In Morrissey, the Supreme 
Court recognized the necessity of vague conditions of probation as consistent with the 
broad discretion of a probation officer, holding that 
The enforcement leverage that supports the parole conditions derives from 
the authority to return the parolee to prison to serve out the balance of his 
sentence if he fails to abide by the rules.  In practice, not every violation of 
parole conditions automatically leads to revocation.  Typically, a parolee will 
be counseled to abide by the conditions of parole, and the parole officer 
ordinarily does not take steps to have parole revoked unless he thinks that the 
violations are serious and continuing so as to indicate that the parolee is not 
adjusting properly and cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.  The 
broad discretion accorded the parole officer is also inherent in some of the 
quite vague conditions, such as the typical requirement that the parolee avoid 
“undesirable” associations or correspondence. 
Id.; see also State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980). 
 147. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. 
 148. Id. 
 149. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769. 
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However, the way in which the opinion is written results in less guidance 
and, perhaps, more confusion for trial courts in EJJ revocation cases. 
Without citing supporting authority, the court concludes that: “The 
relevant mitigating factors are not those circumstances surrounding the 
original offense, but rather the mitigating factors relating to the probation 
violation.”150  No explanation is given for this conclusion.  It may be that 
the court is interpreting the requirement to examine “mitigating factors” 
as consideration of “mitigating circumstances,” required by the Criminal 
Rules of Procedure.151  However, even if this is assumed, it is unclear 
why the court focuses only on the factors relating to the probation 
violation and excludes any consideration of the facts surrounding the 
underlying offense. 
It is arguable that the court’s holding is justified because the 
underlying offense has already been considered in the decision to 
designate an offender as EJJ.152  However, the same is true in adult 
cases.  The underlying offense is an integral part of the original 
sentence.153  If the sentence is stayed, the underlying offense is again 
considered in adult revocation proceedings under the provisions of 
Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines.154 
Because revocation of the EJJ designation results in a transfer of the 
case to adult court, it is logical to apply the adult standards to the 
decision to revoke the stayed adult sentence.  Furthermore, the standards 
set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines are consistent with the intent of the 
EJJ statute.  The Guidelines caution that the decision to revoke is a 
serious one and “should not be a reflexive action to technical violations 
of the condition of the stay.”155  The Guidelines also urge trial courts to 
use “great restraint” in execution of a prison sentence for offenders 
originally convicted of “low severity offenses” or offenders who have 
“short prior criminal histories.”156  The court’s reasoning in B.Y. is 
consistent with this portion of the Sentencing Guidelines.  However, the 
 
 150. Id. at 769-70. 
 151. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.04, subd. 2(1)(d). 
 152. The severity of the offense is one of the six public safety factors the court is 
required to consider under MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 2 (2002). 
 153. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 116 (showing the severity of the offense as 
one of the two factors considered in sentencing). 
 154. Id. § III.B. (2003) (urging less judicial forbearance for violations by those 
“convicted of a more severe offense”); see, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 646 N.W.2d 915, 918 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (considering the severity of the offense during a revocation 
hearing for probation violations). 
 155. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § III.B, supra note 116. 
 156. Id. 
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reasoning in B.Y. ignores the next statement within the Guidelines: “Less 
judicial forbearance is urged for persons violating conditions of a stayed 
sentence who were convicted of a more severe offense or who had a 
longer criminal history.”157  The effect these provisions of the 
Sentencing Guidelines have on EJJ revocation proceedings is a question 
that remains unanswered by this opinion. 
After confining consideration of mitigating factors to circumstances 
relating to the probation violation, the B.Y. court explains the mitigating 
factors it found in the record.  These factors include: B.Y.’s amenability 
to treatment in a probationary setting as demonstrated by his successful 
completion of a juvenile residential program, the term of probation 
violated not being a condition set by the court or perhaps not clearly 
understood by B.Y., and, in light of all the circumstances, the failure to 
show that B.Y. could not be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.158 
While giving guidance on what factors should be considered as part 
of the EJJ revocation decision, the court’s analysis is troubling in a 
number of ways.  First, the court appears to put itself in the position of 
fact finder rather than a reviewing court.  Second, the opinion disregards 
the lower court’s consideration of interim sanctions imposed by the 
probation officer prior to commencement of the violation proceedings. 
The opinion states of B.Y.’s violation of the curfew established by 
the probation officer that “[a]lthough appellant was warned by the 
probation officer of the curfew, it is probable that appellant did not fully 
comprehend the harsh sanction he would face for violating curfew.  
Similarly, it is more probable that such a violation is not evidence that 
appellant is likely to return to criminality.”159  The court makes no 
reference to the record to support these conclusions.  Furthermore, the 
lower-court record does not appear to support these conclusions.  Thus, 
this portion of the opinion indicates a willingness of the B.Y. court to step 
outside its role as a reviewing court and to sit as a fact finder.160 
Equally troubling is the court’s apparent disregard of the trial 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769-72. 
 159. Id. at 770. 
 160. See In re M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Minn. 1990) (discussing the 
purpose of appellate review to determine whether a trial court made an error and not to 
try the case de novo).  Standards of review exist to ensure “uniformity and consistency by 
prohibiting the retrial of a case on appeal.”  Id. at 374.  “Trial courts stand in a superior 
position to appellate courts in assessing the credibility of witnesses.”  Id. at 374-75.  See 
also State v. Kates, 616 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (remanding a case after 
noting that a certain factual determination would exceed the role and ability of an 
appellate court). 
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court’s consideration of intermediate sanctions imposed by the probation 
officer prior to commencement of the violation proceedings.  Although 
the probation violation listed B.Y.’s failure to abide by his curfew as the 
sole grounds for revocation, the attached probable cause statement 
chronicled other behaviors.161  The probable cause statement alleged that 
B.Y. had failed to maintain regular contact with his probation officer, 
attend school, reside at home, abide by the curfew set by his probation 
officer, and had been found in a home where gang members were 
present.162  At the violation hearing, the probation officer informed the 
court that, as a result of these behaviors, B.Y. had been placed on a more 
intense level of supervision, told to perform community work service 
hours (which, according to the probation officer, he had failed to 
complete), and placed in detention for forty-eight hours.163  The 
probation officer also informed the court that the same evening B.Y. was 
released from detention following his forty-eight-hour placement, he 
violated his curfew.164 
The trial court’s Memorandum of Law accompanying the 
revocation order reflects consideration of these intermediate sanctions.165  
Absent the acknowledgement that B.Y. “apparently did not comply” with 
the requirement that he keep in touch with his probation officer,166 the 
B.Y. court does mention the other factors considered by the trial court 
when it concluded that the adult sentence was executed “as a result of a 
curfew violation.”167  Thus, it appears the B.Y. court failed to consider 
the record used by the trial court in deciding to revoke B.Y.’s EJJ 
designation and execute his adult sentence. 
Disregard of the factors considered by the trial court appears 
inconsistent with the standard of review previously applied to both 
juvenile and adult revocation proceedings.  In applying the Austin 
analysis to the record of the proceedings, the B.Y. court does not afford 
the trial court broad discretion.  Nor does the court articulate the trial 
court’s abuse of its broad discretion.  Perhaps one of the most important 
messages lower courts can take from B.Y. is the importance of making a 
 
 161. See Appellant’s Brief and App., supra note 67, at App. 2-3 (citing Order and 
Memorandum).  The original Order and Memorandum is not accessible to the public due 
to B.Y.’s juvenile status at the time of the offense. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 2-4. 
 165. See id. 
 166. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 771. 
 167. Id. 
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complete record of all reasons justifying the trial court’s decision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because it is a case of first impression, the B.Y. decision makes an 
important contribution to the growing body of law governing EJJ 
proceedings.  By holding that the three-step Austin analysis used in adult 
cases also applies to EJJ revocation proceedings, the court provides an 
analytical structure for lower courts to use in EJJ revocation proceedings.  
More guidance is needed as to whether the analysis applies to the 
decision to revoke EJJ designation or only to the decision to revoke the 
stay of execution of sentence upon transfer to adult court.  Application of 
the first two Austin factors is consistent with both the spirit and intent of 
the EJJ statute.  Application of the third Austin factor to the decision to 
revoke the stay of execution of sentence appears consistent with the 
policies applied in adult proceedings; however, it appears inconsistent 
with the intent of the statute to provide certainty of punishment.  In 
addition, the way in which the B.Y. court applies the Austin analysis to 
the facts of the case calls into question previously well-established 
principles of law.  It is now unclear what standard of review will be used, 
and to what extent a probation officer’s authority can be enforced, in EJJ 
revocation cases. The decision leaves as many questions unanswered as 
it answers, and thus ensures further litigation and debate on how best to 
implement Minnesota’s Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile statute. 
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